Brazil Revenue Based Finance – Equity

This resource is offered for information purposes only. It is not legal advice. Readers are urged to seek advice from qualified legal counsel in relation to their specific circumstances. We intend the resource’s contents to be correct and up to date at the time of publication, but we do not guarantee their accuracy or completeness, particularly as circumstances may change after publication. Toniic, the assisting pro bono law firms and the Thomson Reuters Foundation, accept no liability or responsibility for actions taken or not taken or any losses arising from reliance on this resource or any inaccuracies herein.

This analysis was provided by TozziniFreire Advogados

Related Content

The analysis for Brazil includes articles on Brazil Revenue Based Finance -Debt and Brazil Revenue Based Finance – Equity

Executive Summary

This research paper summarizes the main structures identified for revenue-based financings available in Brazil. 

While Brazilian laws does not provide for concepts that are designed specifically for revenue-based financing1 , companies and investors may structure transactions by adjusting existing types of funding mechanisms available under existing regulations. For the purposes herein, we will suggest three types of structures, under equity, debt and receivables discount models:

Equity: investment by acquiring equity interest is one of the most common types of investment in Brazil. The acquisition of equity interest may occur by means of (i) execution of a share/quota purchase agreement, (ii) execution of a convertible loan, (iii) increasing the corporate capital by means of execution of an investment agreement, and (iv) incorporating a Brazilian subsidiary. Brazilian law provides for several types of legal entities, of which the Sociedade Limitada (limited liability company) and the Sociedade Anônima (corporation) are the most commonly used. Other company types are seldom used in practice, because most of them provide for unlimited liability of their partners. For limited liability companies and corporations, the partners liability is limited to their paid stake in the corporate capital and there are generally2 no minimum capital requirements. Moreover, dividends are currently tax exempt in Brazil, regardless of the status of the beneficiary. In this type of investment, it is possible to ensure a minimum return by means of (i) defining the interest in the convertible loan agreement; (ii) a put option, granted in an agreement between the partners and the company; or (iii) using redeemable shares.

Debt: issuance of debentures. A debenture is a security issued by a corporation (sociedade anônima), with mechanics that are similar to bonds governed by New York laws. The terms and conditions of the issuance of the debentures are regulated in an indenture executed by the issuing company. The debentures are essentially fixed-income debt instruments where the debenture holders are entitled to receive the repayment of the principal amount plus an accrued interest (fixed or floating). However, Brazilian laws allow the issuing company to stipulate that debenture holders may have the right to receive a share in the company’s profits or even an additional premium fee, which is based on income or profit variations of the company. The investors are usually represented by a fiduciary agent (similar in nature to a trustee). Debentures are one of the most relevant debt instruments used by companies in the Brazilian capital markets. 

Receivables discount (securitization): funding granted by receivables investment funds (Fundos de Investimento em Direitos Creditórios – “FIDC”), which is a form of condominium regulated by the Brazilian Securities Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários – “CVM). The FIDC is a fund whose main purpose is to purchase receivables from Brazilian entities, and it benefits from technical and specialized services of administration, portfolio management and custody of the investments, provided by regulated entities.  The FIDC is funded by investors, which in turn receives quotas issued by the FIDC. Although the FIDC (and investment funds in general) operate similarly to companies, it does not have a legal personality. Earnings from investments are distributed to FIDC’s quotaholders. On the other hand, the FIDC’s quotaholders also bear losses and other expenses that compose its liabilities. The FIDC is a viable way of ensuring that companies obtain cash by anticipating their receivables (revenues) without incurring in additional debt.

Members of TozziniFreire Advogados are qualified to practice law in the Federative Republic of Brazil.  We do not express herein any answer concerning any law other than the law of the Federative Republic of Brazil.

Equity Interest

Investment Structure Summary

For investment in Brazilian companies, it is possible to (i) incorporate a Brazilian subsidiary or a joint-venture; (ii) acquire quotas/shares held by third parties in a Brazilian entity; (iii) subscribe new quotas or shares in a Brazilian company, by means of a capital increase; or (iv) execute a convertible loan with an existing company.

Category

Equity

Category for tax purposes

Equity investors are compensated either via dividends or gains on the sale of quotas/shares. Dividends are currently tax-     exempt in Brazil, regardless of the status and location of the beneficiary. Capital gains are generally subject to progressive rates ranging from 15% to 22.5%, but actual rates vary depending on the shareholder’s status and location (see Critical Tax Considerations below).

Governance Rights

The owner of the equity interest in Brazilian companies is usually entitled to vote in quotaholders/shareholders resolutions and its voting rights will depend on the percentage held in the Brazilian entity and rights negotiated in the shareholders/quotaholders’ agreement. The lender of a convertible loan will acquire voting rights only after the conversion of the loan, but it is possible to protect the investor with early maturity of the debt.

Investor Qualification Requirements

In general, there are no restrictions on qualification of the investors of Brazilian companies. However, there are specific qualification requirements for investments in certain companies performing regulated activities (e.g., banking, energy, telecommunications, among others).

Also, the investor needs to be enrolled with the Brazilian tax authorities and the Brazilian Central Bank (in case of foreign investors).

Foreign investors must also appoint a Brazilian resident representative as its corporate attorney-in-fact, with powers to receive summons, and also a legal representative before the Brazilian Internal Revenue Service, as required by Law No. 6404 of December 15, 1976.

Currency Considerations

The payment of the corporate capital of the Brazilian entity must be in Brazilian reais. Also, any capital increase of the Brazilian entity made by foreign entities in other currency will need to be converted into Brazilian reais, by means of a foreign exchange agreement, registered with the Brazilian Central Bank.

In case of acquisition from third parties, the payment can be made in another currency.

Collateral

Not applicable

Priority Payment Rights

It is possible to issue preferred shares or quotas in Brazilian entities, with priority in the distribution of dividends or priority in case of liquidation of the company. The issuance of preferred shares is limited to 50% of the company’s voting corporate capital.

Distribution and Redemption Limitations

In order to distribute dividends to its shareholders/quotaholders, the Brazilian entity must have accrued profits in its financial statements sufficient to offset any losses from previous fiscal years, so that the positive difference may be distributed.

Therefore, prior to any distribution, the dividends received in the current fiscal year must be used to reduce the losses from the previous fiscal years and then the balance could be remitted to the shareholders/quotaholders.

It is possible to set a fixed percentage of profits to a partner in a shareholders/quotaholders’ agreement, in order to ensure a minimum capital return.

The payment of the convertible loan is not subject to the existence of profits by the company.

Legal limitations to pricing or total return

Not applicable to limited liability companies. For joint-stock corporations, the issuance price of the shares shall be established without any unjustified dilution of the interests of previous shareholders, even if they have a right of first refusal to subscribe to the shares, taking into account, either alternatively or jointly (i) the profit expectation of the corporation, (ii) the net worth of shares, (iii) the quotation on the stock exchange or organized over-the-counter market, taking into account the premium or discount value due resulting from market conditions, according to Law No. 6404 of December 15, 1976.

For accommodating revenue-based financing, for closely-held companies, it is possible to provide in an investment agreement the schedule of payments of the investor and grant a put option against the invested company or the current partners, in which the put option price will be calculated in accordance with financial indexes, such as revenue, EBITDA, or any other formula to calculate the repayment, using thresholds and payment in installments. In addition, for both closely held and public companies, it is possible to issue common or preferred redeemable shares, provided that the bylaws provide the redemption price, conditions and if the corporate capital will be reduced or not. The redemption price should be calculated using the same criteria as the issuance price mentioned above and the company shall use its profits, its reserves or its corporate capital to pay such price.

Status in Insolvency Proceedings

In case of insolvency of a Brazilian entity, the shareholders/quotaholders are not considered creditors and will only receive any amounts if there outstanding balance after the payment of all creditors.

The lender of a convertible loan, on the other hand, is considered a creditor and an early maturity of the debt in case of insolvency, judicial/extrajudicial recovery or bankruptcy is used to protect the investor.

Limitation of Liability

The investors’ liability is limited to the amount of the corporate capital of the Brazilian entity. 

If the corporate capital of the limited liability company is not paid-in, all quotaholders are jointly liable, limited to the amount of the corporate capital.

The lender of a convertible loan is not exposed to the company’s liabilities.

Transfer Restrictions

There are no general transfer restrictions of shares/quotas provided in Brazilian law. Transfer restrictions are usually provided in the shareholders/quotaholders’ agreement of the Brazilian entity. The most common provisions are:

  1. Right of first offer;
  2.  Right of first refusal;
  3. Lock-up

Critical Tax Considerations

Dividends are currently tax exempt in Brazil, regardless of the status and location of the beneficiary.

Taxation of capital gain on the sale of shares/quotas may vary depending on the shareholder status and location. Brazilian individuals and foreign investors not located in a tax haven jurisdiction will usually be subject to progressive rates ranging from 15% to 22.5%, depending on the size of the gain. The rate is 25% for foreign investor located in a tax haven jurisdiction. Taxation of Brazilian legal entities will vary according to the legal entity’s tax regime. A foreign investor duly registered with Brazilian Central Bank as portfolio investor (Resolution 4.373) and not located in a tax haven jurisdiction will be afforded with capital gain exemption if the sale is carried out in the stock exchange. 

  1.  For the purposes of this research, as instructed, “revenue-based finance” means a funding/finance arrangement under which the investor has a priority right to receive repayment/distributions up to an agreed portion of “gross revenues” or “free cash flow”, until an agreed return on the investment is reached (whether or not the investor continues to participate in the equity upside after that)..
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  2. Certain regulated sectors, such as the banking and insurance sectors, do impose minimum capital requirements. Therefore, it is recommended      to      double-checked this aspect from a regulatory standpoint. ↩︎

Germany Revenue Based Finance

This resource is offered for information purposes only. It is not legal advice. Readers are urged to seek advice from qualified legal counsel in relation to their specific circumstances. We intend the resource’s contents to be correct and up to date at the time of publication, but we do not guarantee their accuracy or completeness, particularly as circumstances may change after publication. Toniic, the assisting pro bono law firms and the Thomson Reuters Foundation, accept no liability or responsibility for actions taken or not taken or any losses arising from reliance on this resource or any inaccuracies herein.

The Germany content consists of this summary page, and separate pages for Preferred Shares in a German Limited Liability Company (“GmbH”), Silent Partnership in a Corporation, and Debt.

Executive Summary1

In the German (debt/equity) market there is no classical “revenue-based finance” in the sense of a (customary) shareholders’/finance arrangement under which the investor has a priority right to receive repayment/distributions up to an agreed portion of “gross revenues” or “free cash flow”, until an agreed return on the investment is reached. However, the following three options come closest thereto: (1) preferred shares in a German Limited Liability Company (“GmbH”), (2) a silent partnership in a German corporation (GmbH or a stock corporation (“AG”)) or (3) a loan to a GmbH, AG or a limited partnership by shares (Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien (“KG aA”)) in combination with a warrant against the company’s/borrower’s shareholder(s) to call for shares (or, alternatively, to opt for a cash settlement) upon a specific trigger event.

Preferred Shares in a GmbH entitle the holder of such shares to a preferred treatment in regards of the priority of distribution of profits among the shareholders, i.e., the other (ordinary) shareholders accept that the investor has a right to repayment by way of distributions of profit (based on the revenue of the GmbH) and that such right needs to be discharged prior to other (ordinary) shareholders receiving their portion of the (remaining) amount to be distributed. Distributions and redemptions are limited by capital maintenance provisions applicable under German law to ensure that the GmbH’s funds in the amount of its registered share capital (Stammkapital) are not diminished by any profit distributions.

A silent partnership in a German corporation is an undisclosed civil law partnership. It can be designed with or without membership rights. In both scenarios, the investor participates in the corporation’s profit. In the typical case of a silent partnership, membership rights are excluded, and the investor solely participates in the corporation’s profit, for which reason the silent partnership is considered a debt instrument. The atypical silent partnership includes membership rights and/or entitles to participate in hidden reserves. Therefore, for tax and insolvency purposes, it is categorized as an equity instrument.

The combination of a loan to a GmbH, AG or KG aA combined with a warrant against its shareholder(s) combines a debt and an equity instrument. The warrant to call for shares or, alternatively, to opt for a cash settlement is mostly designed in the form of a right to demand release of proceeds. Usually, the warrant is designed without any membership rights or equivalent influence in order to avoid subordination in an insolvency scenario.

In any of the three options contestations by an insolvency administrator of repayments/distributions made to the investor needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis in the light of German insolvency law. For the instruments qualifying as equity or the investor qualifying as a shareholder or as shareholder like – which can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis -, investor’s claims are subordinated pursuant to German insolvency law.

Withholding tax on payments received by the investor is triggered in case of preferred shares. In case of the other instruments, it needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis (details below). 

United States (NY) Revenue Based Finance

This resource is offered for information purposes only. It is not legal advice. Readers are urged to seek advice from qualified legal counsel in relation to their specific circumstances. We intend the resource’s contents to be correct and up to date at the time of publication, but we do not guarantee their accuracy or completeness, particularly as circumstances may change after publication. Toniic, the assisting pro bono law firms and the Thomson Reuters Foundation, accept no liability or responsibility for actions taken or not taken or any losses arising from reliance on this resource or any inaccuracies herein.

Revenue-based Debt

Investment Structure Summary

Investor makes a loan to Company with periodic payments sized based on actual revenues, which loan may or may not be secured. 

While most credit is extended based on projected cash flows, the parties may agree specifically that periodic (e.g. semi-annual) debt service payments of principal and interest are made in cash up to an agreed percentage of revenues received since the last payment date. Any principal and accrued interest remaining outstanding must be repaid on the final maturity date.

The Company will pay interest on the debt on each payment date up to the amount corresponding to the agreed percentage of revenues received in the corresponding period. The parties will typically agree that, if such amount of revenues is not sufficient to pay all of the accrued interest, interest in excess of that amount is paid-in-kind, by issuing new debt in the same amount or simply capitalizing the unpaid interest by adding it to the outstanding principal amount. Distributions to equity holders are usually not permitted unless the Company is satisfying specific financial tests, including as to meeting early amortization targets and debt service.

If the relevant portion of revenues is in excess of accrued interest, the Company would typically be required to apply the excess revenues up to the agreed percentage to prepay principal on each payment date.

This structure is essentially a form of cash sweep arrangement. While the amount of the cash sweep may be tied to a percentage of revenues as described above, debt documentation will often permit the borrower to pay operating and other critical expenses agreed to be necessary to keep the business running prior to paying debt service, sometimes setting out a cash waterfall for narrower controls over the allocation of cash in each payment period. 

This arrangement is beneficial to the Company and the Investor in that it offers protection for the Company against cash shortfalls for the payment of debt service prior to maturity, while mitigating the repayment risk at maturity by applying excess cash flows to prepayment. However, it is critical for parties to make sure the agreed terms will leave sufficient cash in each period to allow the Company to meet ordinary course expenses that are necessary to run its business, at the risk of the cash sweep jeopardizing the Company’s ability to generate future revenue. While this type of funding may be supported by a percentage of gross revenues, in effect the cash flows available for repayment are likely to be limited by the borrower’s operating margin.

There is a range of features that can be agreed to mitigate Investor’s risk and achieve better pricing from the Company’s perspective or longer tenors, including:

  • Collateral security, in particular as it relates to the Company’s accounts where revenues are received;
  • Account waterfall, where Company can only make payments from the secured accounts as agreed with Investor;
  • Debt service reserve accounts, where the Borrower may be required to deposit cash remaining after the cash sweep in each period, until a target amount is reserved (e.g. one or two periods of debt service). The reserved amounts can be used to pay accrued interest in cash during low revenue periods;
  • Budget approval requirements to allow the Investor to control the amount of essential expenditures to be paid prior to debt service in the waterfall;
  • Restrictions on dividends and other distributions consisting of financial tests designed to prevent cash leakage in case of low business performance; and
  • Investor access to equity upside, either by making the debt convertible into shares or other equity interests based on a pre-agreed share pricing framework, or having the Company issue warrants exercisable at maturity for the Investor to acquire shares or membership interests in the Company. 

Category

Debt (and equity to the extent of any permitted debt convertibility or warrants in the structure).

In the U.S., the IRS may deem certain debt transactions as “disguised” equity transactions, recharacterizing interest payments as equity distributions to disallow interest deduction by the Investor. Similarly, U.S. courts may recharacterize debt positions as equity, downgrading them in priority in bankruptcy, where debt has priority over equity.

There are a range of factors that may expose a debt transaction to recharacterization as equity, although the threshold for courts to do so is considered relatively high. In the bankruptcy space, federal circuit courts have adopted divergent approaches to the question, in some cases deferring to state laws entirely and in others applying a variety of multi-prong tests. The types of aspects typically taken into account in determining whether a debt transaction is more akin to equity include the following, among others:

  • the names given to instruments used to document the transaction;
  • whether there is a final maturity date for repayment;
  • whether there is a specified interest rate with periodic interest payment dates; 
  • whether collateral security is provided;
  • whether the debt is subordinated to other indebtedness of the Company;
  • whether the Company is sufficiently capitalized;
  • whether the Company would have been able to obtain financing from unaffiliated lenders; 
  • whether the investor has (and exercises) typical creditor remedies; and
  • whether the proceeds were used to purchase capital assets.

Governance Rights

Generally, there is no dilution of ownership in this kind of financing and lenders do not require a board seat, except to the extent of equity acquired by Investor as a result of conversion permitted by the relevant debt documents or the exercise of warrants received as part of compensation. 

Equity participation

Parties may agree that the outstanding principal amount of the loans (including interest paid in kind) is convertible into shares of the borrower according to a pre-agreed pricing methodology after a certain date or upon the occurrence of pre-agreed triggers.

Alternatively, the Company may be required to issue warrants upfront as part of its compensation to the Investor. Warrants give the holder the right to acquire stock from the Company at a specified date and a specified price. In either case the parties may agree on specific methodologies for the calculation of the quantity or price of the shares to be acquired upon exercise.

Convertible debt and warrants are similar in that they allow the Investor to obtain equity upside if the business thrives. However, warrants can be detached from the debt and do not require an exchange of the debt for shares (i.e. the Investor may exercise the warrant and keep the debt, or sell the warrant to a third party and keep the debt). 

Investor Qualification Requirements

There are no specific qualification requirements generally applicable to investors in revenue-linked indebtedness; however, note that certain types of transactions may be subject to such requirements and other regulations, in particular the issuance securities, which is subject to strict federal and state securities laws.

Currency Considerations

There are no specific currency considerations generally applicable in connection with revenue-linked indebtedness, except (1) from a credit risk perspective, in connection with any mismatches between the currencies of the Company’s revenues and expenses, or (2) in cross-border transactions, where it is important to determine that the foreign-based borrower will have the ability to acquire U.S. dollars and remit them abroad to repay the debt, or that a judgment for collection will be enforceable for the full amount of the debt in the currency in which it was originally denominated.

Collateral

To be negotiated among the parties.

In the case of financings that are made available on the basis of contracted cash flows, it would be typical for the Investor to require a collateral assignment of the revenue contract. Although the underlying contract may include restrictions to assignment, such as making it subject to counterparty consent, the Uniform Commercial Code, which governs most security interests on personal property, includes provisions that ensure the ability to assign rights to payments in spite of such restrictions in most cases.

In transactions where Investor control of cash allocations is critical, debt documents may include security interests on bank accounts and a contractual framework to govern cash management. It is also not unusual for corporate loans to be secured by liens on the shares in the Company and a blanket security interest by the Company on most of its assets.  

Depending on the borrower’s credit, it would not be uncommon for debt to be secured by a lien on all of the assets of the borrower and/or the shares in the borrower.

Priority Payment Rights

Debt holders take priority over equity holders in bankruptcy. As to other creditors, the Investor will have priority to the extent of any collateral security granted to it, but otherwise generally will rank at the same level as other debt holders, except holders of subordinated debt. 

Note that certain types of credits may take priority over unsecured debt holders in general, such as certain claims for wages and work-related benefits, certain tax claims and claims in respect of services, goods or indebtedness provided after the bankruptcy filing. 

Legal limitations to pricing or total return

In some states, predatory financing practices could lead to claims under state unfair and deceptive acts and practices, usury, predatory lending, fraud, good faith and fair dealing laws. 

Usury laws will typically impose limitations to the interest rate that can accrue on certain types of debt, depending on factors such as whether the interest rate is agreed in writing and whether the borrower is an individual or a business. Usury laws vary by state. In New York, usury laws’ limitations to interest rates only apply to loans under $2.5 million; for transactions below that amount, charging interest above 25% per annum may constitute a crime, and interest charged from individuals for debt below $250,000 cannot exceed 16%.

In some jurisdictions, specific regulations have been enacted that require or will require specific disclosures, and in some cases specific registrations, from revenue-based and other commercial financing providers.

Limitation of Liability

Investors’ liability towards the Company will generally be limited to the amount of their loan commitment.  

Transfer Restrictions

There are no standard or mandatory transfer restrictions, although the parties can agree otherwise. Debt securities might be subject to transfer restrictions under federal securities laws.

Comparison to Revenue Sales and Equity Investments

The term “revenue-based financing” is typically used interchangeably to describe different types of financing structures. In some contexts, this term is used specifically to refer to revenue sale transactions, instead of loan financings. In revenue sale transactions, the investor is taking the business risk – it only gets paid if and when the revenues are generated. If the issuer fails and never receives any revenues, the investor never receives a return, approximating it to an equity investment.

Similar transactions may also be structured as a preferred equity investment, where the preferred investor has a preference vis a vis the other shareholders for the receipt of distributions. The amount of the preferred distributions may be determined as a percentage of gross-revenues, and be payable to the preferred shareholders before other shareholders receive any distributions.

Preferred investments may be redeemable or not. Redeemable preferred shares may be redeemable by the issuer or at the option of the investor, upon agreed conditions. Parties may also agree that preferred distributions will be made in the form of share redemptions instead of dividends, such that the investors’ equity position is reduced over time.

In the case of preferred equity investments, as a general rule dividend distributions will be limited by the issuer’s retained earnings – rules vary depending on the jurisdiction of the issuer, but typically companies cannot make dividend distributions in excess of retained earnings outside of extraordinary situations. This might mean that, even if the issuer earned revenues, it may not have cash available for distribution (or which is legally permissible to distribute) – in these cases, parties will typically agree that the distribution is made in kind (i.e. by issuing new shares to the investor) or that the dividends will accumulate and be paid when cash flows permit, or at liquidation or upon redemption.

Non-equity transactions, such as debt financing, are not subject to this retained earnings-related limitation. Additionally, debt transaction have a maturity date by which the loan has to be repaid in full, with the amount of revenues received potentially resulting in faster repayment via de cash sweep. In revenue sale and equity structures, there is typically no maturity date or schedule of payments.

Equity holders also take a backseat to other creditors in a liquidation scenario, and are only paid after debt claims are paid in full.

Singapore Revenue Based Finance

This resource is offered for information purposes only. It is not legal advice. Readers are urged to seek advice from qualified legal counsel in relation to their specific circumstances. We intend the resource’s contents to be correct and up to date at the time of publication, but we do not guarantee their accuracy or completeness, particularly as circumstances may change after publication. Toniic, the assisting pro bono law firms and the Thomson Reuters Foundation, accept no liability or responsibility for actions taken or not taken or any losses arising from reliance on this resource or any inaccuracies herein.

Revenue Sharing Agreement

Investment Structure Summary

In general, revenue sharing agreements be structured in a variety of methods under Singapore law by utilising elements of equity and/or debt. We have prepared the following summary based on two predominant methods of revenue sharing observed in the market:

  • an equity-like structure where the investor subscribe for securities in the company that is the subject of the investment (the “Company”), in return for which they typically receive a regular share of the Company’s post-tax profits through dividend payments; and 
  • a debt-like structure where the investor advances a principal sum to the Company as a loan, and the Company then makes regular repayments to the investors until a predetermined amount has been paid (e.g., 3-5x of the original principal amount advanced by investor(s)).
  •  

In each case, the agreement would be entered into between the Company, the investor(s) and, if necessary, a guarantor and an agent. 

The precise content of the agreement (and therefore the revenue sharing arrangements) is to be agreed between the parties. To illustrate, the agreement may provide that the investor will provide an amount to the Company in connection with the entry into the agreement and the Company will make periodic payments to the investors in accordance with an agreed revenue sharing percentage, schedule and/or until a fixed due date. 

The guarantor will guarantee to the investors the performance of the Company’s obligations under the agreement. The guarantor may be particularly relevant if there is any question in respect of the Company’s creditworthiness.

The agent will facilitate the revenue sharing arrangement (e.g. administering payments) and may be particularly relevant where there is a large number of investors or there is a need for investors to be able to trade (i.e. transfer) their interest in the revenue sharing agreement. 

Category

Equity and debt

Category for tax purposes

Singapore has no capital gains tax, thus taking out cash as a contractual contingency (versus equity) generally does not provide any obvious tax efficiencies.

Otherwise, the precise content of the agreement can be agreed between the parties, and the specific tax arrangements will depend on the precise outcome.

Governance Rights

If the investor own equity in the Company, the parties can agree to include governance rights for the investor to participate in or influence the management of the Company, including any observation or consultation rights, voting rights, veto/approval rights in respect of particular matters, whether from equity or contractual rights and whether or not contingent upon the occurrence of specified events (e.g. springing right to vote in case of underperformance). 

If the investor has only advanced a loan without any equity component, it typically does not receive any governance rights in the Company in the absence of an event of default under a secured loan which triggers a receivership procedure. 

Investor Qualification Requirements

None, but in some cases, investors might require a license to advance a loan under the Moneylenders Act 2008.

Currency Considerations

The investment (and related payment obligations) may be denominated in any currency.

There are no material restrictions or conditions for the remittance of investment proceeds outside of Singapore. 

Collateral

The parties can agree whether the agreement should include any collateral and/or guarantees. Among other things, the need for collateral and/or guarantees might rest on the creditworthiness and financial standing of the Company as well as the precise extent and duration of the revenue sharing arrangements.

Priority Payment Rights

The parties can agree whether the agreement should include a preferential right for the investor to receive distributions based on an agreed portion of (1) gross revenues, (2) free cash flow and/or (3) net income. 

Similar agreements would normally include late payment penalty and interest provisions to incentivize the parties’ timely fulfilment of their respective payment obligations. 

The Company may negotiate for the benefit of early total payment provisions which may have the effect of releasing it from all or part of its revenue sharing obligations.

Distribution and Redemption Limitations

Distribution and Redemption Limitations: The general rule under the Companies Act 1967 is the dividends can only be paid out of profits (including capital appreciation).

Aside from the above, the parties can agree whether the agreement should provide that the making of dividend payments or other distributions by the Company to investor as agreed pursuant to the transaction would be subject to any mandatory conditions, from an accounting perspective or otherwise (e.g. timing or frequency limitations, retained earnings or gains requirements, obligations that have mandatory priority over distributions to investor, limitations on mandatory redemptions for equity instruments, etc.)

Legal limitations to pricing or total return

There are no general restrictions under Singapore law. 

For the avoidance of doubt, there are no usury laws in Singapore, but any provision that requires payment of an additional or default interest pay not be enforceable if the payment is deemed to amount to a penalty sum (e.g., if the default interest is set so high as to be disproportionate to the lenders’ loss). 

Status in Insolvency Proceedings

Subject to any agreed collateral and/or guarantees, the investors will be an unsecured creditor of the Company.

Limitation of Liability

This is subject to contract and the parties can agree the precise liability regime and any limits on liability in the agreement.

The parties should consider and specify whether investors’ liability towards the Company and its creditors is limited to its funded or committed investment. The parties may further indicate whether specific types of liability or actions may be exceptions to such limitation (e.g. labor/pension claims, environmental claims, fraud).

If there is an agent in the structure, the investors will likely be required to indemnify the agent from all losses arising out of or incurred in connection with any claim brought by a third party against the agent for wrongdoing other than the agent’s gross negligence or willful misconduct.

The Company will likely be required to indemnify the investors against any losses incurred by the investors as a result of event of defaults or failure by the Company to pay any amount under the agreement. 

Transfer Restrictions

The parties can agree whether the investment would be subject to any transfer restrictions (e.g. limitations to assignment or other dispositions, securities laws limitations, approval for admission of new members/shareholders, etc.)

Critical Tax Considerations:

As mentioned above, Singapore has no capital gains tax, thus taking out cash as a contractual contingency (versus equity) generally does not provide any obvious tax efficiencies.

Otherwise, the precise content of the agreement can be agreed between the parties, and the specific tax arrangements will depend on the precise outcome.

Case study – Blended Finance Vehicle – California Rebuilding Fund

Case Study provided by Morrison & Foerster

Summary

Morrison & Foerster LLP was a founding member of the California Small Enterprise (CASE) Task Force, which was formed in March 2020 to address the needs of small businesses in California amidst the COVID pandemic. The CASE Task Force (comprised of lawyers, academics, CDFIs, and local business leaders) initially gathered to provide a comprehensive county-level handbook to assist small businesses in navigating the pandemic and also (together with a dozen other law firms) to staff a free, weekly hotline. 

The CASE Task Force then also set out to pull together a financing structure to provide recovery loans to small businesses in California, which resulted in the California Rebuilding Fund. The blended finance structure leveraged state guaranty funds (including the California bank guaranty program), philanthropic funds, subordinated loans (from foundations and program related investment (PRI) investors) and senior bank capital to reach underserved small businesses which have been traditionally under-resourced and disproportionately impacted as a result of COVID. The fund used CDFIs to distribute cash, using a coordinated technology platform (run by CRF – another CDFI) and created a new economic model to strengthen and support CDFIs.

The structure is innovative on a number of different levels including: (i) using third party non-profit (Kiva) as the fund manager to allow for donations and PRI investments, (ii) establishing a governance and allocation committee comprised of local leaders, lenders, academics and lawyers to allow for flexible and impartial approvals of changes as the structure progressed, (iii) leveraging government funds and guaranty programs, (iv) bringing loans off balance sheet for CDFIs which is a major limiting factor in their ability to scale and (v) using a technology platform to allow for insight across CDFIs and to ensure fair and equal allocation among all geographies.

1. Beneficiaries

The beneficiaries of the fund are small businesses in California. So far over loans have been made to over 700 small businesses in 36 counties across the state with a total of over $45 million being funded to date. Of the these loans, over 80% have been made to a business owned be a woman or person of color located in a low- or moderate-income community. Indirectly, we are also helping the CDFIs involved in the transaction.

2. Structure

This California Rebuilding Fund structure is innovative on many dimensions: 

  • It blends government money (either a guaranty of small business loans or providing subordinate first loss guaranty funds into the structure) with donations/grants and PRI capital which forms additional subordinated capital and senior bank capital – this allows us to leverage the subordinated capital to crowd in private capital
  • Has a third party owner and management structure which allows for real time changes and decisions to ensure that the mission of the program is achieved – which is helping the smallest of the small businesses which have been most severely affected by the pandemic and left out of other programs such as PPP (ex. the committee is able to ask CDFIs to prioritize certain geographies if we see that small business owners in those areas are falling out of the pipeline) 
  • Creates a homogenous product so that we can create a pool of assets which we can raise capital for – this is significantly more efficient than each CDFI raising capital on its own
  • Creates an off balance sheet structure for the CDFIs – one of the greatest challenges to CDFIs is that they are required to hold significant net assets and as a non-profit growing those net assets is very hard – this structure moves 90-95% of the originated loans off balance sheet for the CDFIs allowing them to do 20x leverage rather than 4x leverage which is typically what they could do 
  • Uses a single platform for loan applicants – Connect to Capital (CRF’s technology platform) allows for us to see in real time the loans being approved, what loans are not being approved (and the reasons for rejection) and allows us to through the fund structure (committee) to adapt to make sure that we’re reaching the most vulnerable populations (ex. we have found that increasing TA assistance is key to making sure that certain applicants don’t fall out of pipeline), or asking CDFIs to prioritize certain zip codes to ensure equal distribution of funds 
  • Reducing client acquisition costs for CDFIs – CDFIs have a high client acquisition cost. Coordinating efforts and leveraging Governor Newsom’s communications infrastructure allowed us to get the message out with no cost to the CDFIs. In this structure they did not have to go out to find new borrowers. 
  • Reaching underserved communities – using the community partners we are able to ensure that we reduce inequalities programs like PPP experienced. They can provide technical assistance and are a trusted resource which encourages under-represented small businesses to apply. These community TA provides (various local chambers) also allowed us to send rejected applicants links to additional resources that could provide assistance even if they did not qualify for a loan through our fund. 

Each one of these features requires significant and creative legal thinking and structuring to ensure that they work for all parties involved – and never losing sight of the ultimate mission to provide capital to the smallest of the small businesses with an emphasis on traditionally underserved and under-resourced communities.

3. Impact

The CASE Task Force expect to serve at least 3,000 small businesses with an affordable loan product (4.25% interest with interest only payments for the first 12 months) and hopefully many more as the facility has the ability to upsize to $500 million. We expect to reach due to our intentionality and the partners that we have chosen to work with (CDFIs) businesses and communities which have traditionally been underserved and under-resourced.

In May 2020 Calvert Impact Capital launched the NY Forward Loan Fund. This model was replicated (with modifications) for the California Rebuilding Fund which was launched in November 2020. In early 2021, Calvert also replicated this structure to launch the Southern Opportunity and Resilience (SOAR) Fund which includes 13 states in the South East. Additionally, Governor Inslee has announced state commitment to launch a fund in WA state in spring 2021. 

The number of these funds clearly indicates that it can be replicated and each fund contains an accordion feature which allows for it to scale as more capital is committed. The major barrier to scale is finding subordinate capital – state/government funds are key in getting the structure launched quickly. However, the structure does work even without state guaranty (ex. the second CA fund and the SOAR Fund which will have no government money).

4. Goals

The goals of the CASE Task Force is for people, organizations and government to dream big. CASE Task Force would love to see a $10 billion federally funded national program. Initially when we embarked on forming the California Rebuilding Fund, we wanted to launch one or two to prove that this could work and then launch a national program. Unfortunately, since in many circumstances subordinate capital comes from the states, there are geographical restrictions on its use. It is inefficient and costly to create multiple loan funds based upon geography, and our hope is that the Biden administration considers providing loss reserves to support this type of lending. The California Rebuilding Fund and other similar funds have demonstrated that it is effective and easy to scale. A national public-private partnership would enable drastic increases in access to affordable and flexible working capital for small businesses and non-profits owned by women and people of color, those located in LMI communities and who are otherwise un- or under-banked, a population that we think will grow much larger as banks pull back.

5. Case members

The following is a list of participating members of the CASE Task Force:

  • Kiva, Calvert Impact Capital, Morrison & Foerster LLP, California Ibank 
  • CDFIs (CRF, 3Core, Access+Capital, Accion, CDC, ICA, Main Street Launch, Meda, NAAC, Opportunity Fund, PACE, PCV, Working Solutions and others) 
  • Business support organizations (CA black chamber of commerce, CAMEO, CalAsian, CA Hispanic Chambers, SBDC California, Small Business Majority) 
  • Lenders and Investors (some have chosen to remain anonymous so this is not a comprehensive list – Wells Fargo, First Republic, Grove Foundation, Kapor, Panta Rhea, All Home, Self Help) 
  • Other supporters (Berkeley Haas, Berkeley Law, California Governor’s office of business and economic development)

Case Study provided by Morrison & Foerster

Revenue Based Finance

Revenue Based Finance are a category of contingent payment investment structures where the payment to the investor is contingent on the amount and timing of the issuers financial performance, typically measured by cash basis revenues. While, for reasons outlined below, it is most common to use revenue as the contingent payment source, some structures use other income statement or cash flow accounting entries. (See Demand Dividends as example) As a term of art, these structures are frequently considered to be part of Revenue Based Finance despite the use of a different accounting lines.

Reasons for Revenue Based Finance

Revenue Based Finance is often used as an technique for realizing an alternative exit when other financial Strucures are not likely to provide an exit to investors. Revenue Based Finance is also used to achieve Appropriate Capital to algin company performance with investor returns

Revenue Based Finance Structuring Options

The structures are typically designed to stop paying investors when the investor has received the negotiated target return. Typically, that negotiated return is expressed as a multiple of the initial investment.  For example, investors seeking a 3X return target that has invested $100,000 would receive their share of revenues until the investor has been paid $100,000 X 3 = $300,000. It’s important to note that the investors return on capital will depend on the timing of the payments – and thus will depend on the rate of revenue growth.   The same 3x return target will have a much better return on capital if the company has fast revenue growth compared to the same company if it experiences slower revenue growth.

Revenue Based Exits can either be set up as debt or equity structures depending on the local laws.  When using equity they are typically Redemption Based Exits in that the issuer is obligated to repurchase the equity from the investor at a specified premium.  In Revenue Based exit Structured as debt, the payments to the investor are treated as a mix of interest and principal payments.

Revenue Based Finance Structures

Demand Dividends

Demand Dividends are a structure created by Santa Clara University. Demand Dividends are contingent payment instruments that dedicated a percentage of free cash flow as the source of returns to investors.  Like Revenue Based Exits, they are typically designed to stop paying investors when the investor has received the negotiated target return.

Royalty Financing

Royalty Financing in Impact Investing repurposes the royalty payments from traditional finance to meet the needs of Impact Investors

In traditional finance, Royalties are a mechanism for paying for intellectual property.  Most legal jurisdictions have clear definition of royalties and their accounting treatment and definition may vary between legal jurisdictions.

Many impact investing structures would be significantly easier to classify as royalties as the accounting and tax rules for royalties are well defined and simple.   Royalties are only treated as income as the sales on which those royalties depend occur.  For example a book publisher will owe royalties to an author only when that author’s book sells.

Unfortunately many tax juridiscinos limit the use of royalty accounting to their traditional use as payments for intellectual property.   For example, in many jurisdictions a Revenue Financing structure cant simply be called a Royalty Structure with the hope that the accounting will be as simple as royalty accounting.  This is because doing so would facilitate tax avoidance structures in traditionally busessiness.

Redemption Based Exits

Redemption Based Exists re typically equity structures where the investment structure requires the company to redeem (repurchase) the equity shares from the investors.  The terms of repurchase agreements vary between structures but generally include a method for the investors to, over the life of the security, receive a specified multiple of their original investment as the premium paid for the redemptions.

Examples include Indie.vc

Hybrid Strucures

Hybrid Revenue Based Finance Strucures typically provide investor returns by a mix of redemptions with another payment stream like interest payments or dividend payments.   Examples of hybrid structures include Performance Aligned Stock


Key Considerations for Deal Structuring

Legal and Accounting Considerations

Complexity

Complexity is an important consideration when seeking the most appropriate capital for a company.  If the needs for capital are appropriately met with traditional structures then using traditional structures will likely reduce transaction costs and investor reticence.

Many of the alternative exit structures are new, are not well understood by many practitioners, and have less clarity about their tax, accounting, and legal merits than traditional exits.  These complexities can add costs and slow the transaction process.

Equity vs Debt

It’s important to understand that just because a security is labeled as “equity” or “debt” does not mean that the local tax authorities will accept that label.  It is common for tax authorities to have procedures to reclassify securities based on their economic structures.  Any reclassification could significantly change the economics of the security and/or increase the difficulty of accounting and other compliance elements.

We recommend any investor or entrepreneur seeking to use an alternate exit structure seek professional advice on the tax implications with a specific focus on reclassification risk.

Usury Laws

When an alternative exit uses a debt structure or a structure that could be reclassified as debt issuers must be careful that the nature of the contingent payments don’t violate local usury laws.  Usury laws are laws that set a maximum interest rate on debt payments.

What is interest vs principal?

When an issuer pays an investor some return on a debt structure it needs to be clear to both parties what portion of the payment is interest and what portion is principal.  This distinction is important because generally the return of principal is not taxed but the interest is subject to taxation.

Traditional investment structures calculate the principal and interest portions of a payment using near-universally accepted amortization tables.  With many alternative exit debt structures it is not clear how to create an amortization table that is accepted by the local tax authorities.

For example, consider a debt based alternative exit where the source of returns is a fixed percentage of revenues until the investor receives 3 (three) times their initial investment (a revenue based contingent payment).  If the investor invested $100,000 then when the transaction has completed its duration the investor will have received $300,000 in payments of which $100,000 has to be treated as return of principle and $200,000 has to be treated as interest..  If the first payment is $10,000 – what portion of that is principal and what is interest?  It might make sense to call ⅓ principal and ⅔ interest.  It also might make sense to call the entire $100,000 of payments principal and then all the rest interest.

While it is possible that your local tax jurisdiction will not have clear rules, it is more likely that they do have rules for properly apportioning principle and interest because not having those rules would have made it easy for investors to take advantage of their absence and create investment structures that are intended to delay, defer or avoid taxes.

Complicated accounting requirements

Some tax jurisdictions solve the above referenced question of apportioning interest and principle by imposing complicated tax accounting methods that can be burdensome to administer and may even create tax disadvantages to the investor.

For example, in the United States the law (26 CFR § 1.1275-4) reqires contingent payments instruments to be treated as if they were not in fact contingent using the Noncontingent bond method. In addition to the added complication, this often has the negative consequence of requiring, in the early years of an investment, the investor to pay tax on income they will not receive until the later years of the investment.

Distribution rules (eg re dividends and Board approval)

Local lay may have rules that need to be carefully considered when using equity instruments for alternative exits, especially when using a dividend as part of the structure.  Traditionally dividends may need to be authorized by the board and their may be restrictions on payment if the issuer does not have retained earnings.

Downside Protection

Traditional investment structures have clause for when the investment does not perform or when the company is forced to restructure or close.  The order in which creditors and investors get repaid in those cases is one of the negotiable features of term sheets but is generally based on the overall structure of the transaction with debt having higher preference than equity.  To the extent that an alternative exit has an economic structure that is different than its legal structure (eg a debt based exit that offers equity returns) the parties need to consider the appropriate downside protection.

Considerations by Legal Jurisdiction

The key questions that you need to ask to figure out what exit structures work in a given local legal system:

  • Do the tax authorities have rules for reclassifying debt as equity (or vice versa) – that is, is it possible that designing a debt instrument that pays variable payments (eg revenue based) would be reclassified as equity
    • if those rules exist you may need to create an equity structure
    • if those rules don’t exist then,
      • how are contingent payment debt securities taxed and accounted for.
        • how is each payment split between the return of principle vs interest? (need to know for investor and issuer – may not be the same)
        • are there rules that force contingent payment debt instruments to be accounted for in a way that may create phantom tax (in the US, for example, you have to act as if the payments were non contingent and create an amortization schedule and make tax payments based on that schedule – not just on what each payment ends up being)
    • Could designing an equity structure with mandatory redemptions be reclassified as debt
      • if yes this loops back to the questions re debt payments above
      • if no then equity with mandatory redemption contingent on (revenue %) is an easy option

Example Term Sheets



Additional Resources